CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-A PRISONER
MUST PROVE THAT PRISON OFFICIALS ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS FOR SUCH
CONDITIONS TO CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,'
which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, affords convicted
2
criminals valuable protection against inhumane treatment.
Before the twentieth century, courts narrowly construed the
Eighth Amendment to proscribe only the most heinous punishments, such as disembowelment, public dissection, beheading
and burning.' As society progressed, however, so too did its perception of what constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 4 As a
I The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2 See William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986). Justice Brennan posited:
I view the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as embodying to a unique degree the moral principles that
substantively restrain the punishments our civilized society may impose ....

It is thus consistent with the fundamental premise of the

Constitution that even the most base criminal remains a human being
possessed of some potential, at least, for common human dignity.
Id. at 443- 44. See generally Anthony F. Grannucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). The framers of the
American Bill of Rights actually adopted the Eighth Amendment from the English
Bill of Rights of 1689. Id. at 840. Most historians believe that the English treason
trial of 1685, commonly known as the "Bloody Assize," gave rise to the promulgation of a cruel and unusual punishment clause in the English Bill of Rights. Id. at
853. During the trials, hundreds of people, even those who pleaded not guilty,
were executed. Id. at 854.
3 Id. For example, the common punishment for a woman felon in seventeenth
century England was to be burned alive. Id. The common punishment for treason
"consisted of drawing the condemned man on a cart to the gallows, where he was
hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive, disembowelled and his bowels burnt
before him, and then beheaded and quartered." Id. (citation omitted). Historians
deduced that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the English Bill of Rights
was intended to curb these barbaric forms of punishment. Id. The framers, however, may have actually misinterpreted the English model. Id. at 860. Specifically,
the English version used the word "cruel" as synonymous for severe or hard punishment. Id. Grannucci stated that "[i]n the seventeenth century, the word 'cruel'
had a less onerous meaning than it has today. In normal usage it simply meant
severe or hard." Id. The English prototype of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, according to Grannucci, was intended to prevent disproportionate punishments. Id. The framers of the American Constitution, in contrast, interpreted the
clause as a proscription against torturous punishment rather than as a prohibition
against excessive punishment. Id. at 865.
4 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1975) (application of the Eighth
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result, twentieth century courts have interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to restrict the length and character of sentences5 as
well as to require minimum standards for conditions of
6
confinement.
In recent years, the quality of prison conditions has become
the subject of much debate.' With the crime rate on the rise8 and
stricter sentencing guidelines in place, 9 the number of individuals being incarcerated has grown astronomically.'0 Meanwhile,
space available to house prison inmates has grown increasingly
Amendment to capital punishment). Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
remarked:
[T]he Court has not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth
Amendment to "barbarous" methods that were generally outlawed in
the 18th century. Instead, the Amendment has been interpreted in a
flexible and dynamic manner. The Court early recognized that "a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth." Thus, the Clause forbidding "cruel and
unusual punishments" is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice.
Id. at 171 (citations omitted); see also Stephen J. Durkin, Note, Rhodes v. Chapman:
Prison Overcrowding-Evolving Standards Evading an IncreasingProblem, 8 NEw ENG. J.
OF PRISON L. 249 (1982). Durkin remarked that the United States Supreme Court
first addressed the restraints that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause placed
upon prison conditions. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). The
author criticized the Court, however, for failing to provide a definitive method to
evaluate prison condition claims in light of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 251.
5 See generally Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment
Challenges to the Length of a CriminalSentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent
to Precedent," 27 ARIz. L. REV. 25, 26 (1985) (discussing the Supreme Court's application of the Eighth Amendment to the length of prison sentences and exploring
such seminal decisions as Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Hutto v. Davis, 454
U.S. 370 (1982), Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), and Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
6 See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
7 See id.; see also Deborah A. Montick, Comment, Challenging Cruel and Unusual
Conditions of Prison Confinement: Refining the Totality of Conditions Approach, 26 How. L.J.
227 (1983). Montick explored the recent application of the Eighth Amendment to
confinement conditions. Id. at 229. The author noted that courts throughout the
country are employing a totality of the conditions approach to determine whether
penitentiary conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 230-32.
8 See Alfred Blumstein, Planningfor Future Prison Needs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 207,
208 (1984) (discussing factors contributing to expanded prison populations and
resultant congestion problems).
9 See Judy G. Gordon & Susan Wallace, Long-Term Inmates, FED. PRISON J., Summer 1991, at 61. The authors commented that, recently, more prisoners are facing
longer sentences because of modifications in sentencing legislation that have curtailed allowances, such as good-time, required mandatory minimum prison
sentences and eliminated parole. Id.
10 See Scott Styles, Conditions of Confinement Suits-What Has the Bureau of Prisons
Learned?, FED. PRISONJ., Summer 1991, at 47. Recent studies project that 100,000
inmates will be incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons by 1995. Id.
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inadequate." Consequently, prison officials have witnessed the
onslaught of many derivative problems, including the lack of sufficient space, decline in prison sanitation, decreases in the availability of educational and vocational work activities, lack of
12
adequate medical treatment and an increase in prison violence.
For many years, however, courts advocated a "hands off"
approach to claims involving prison conditions.13 Courts deferred to legislatures to ameliorate derivative conditions resulting from institutional overcrowding.' 4 In the 1960's, America
I I See Blumstein, supra note 8, at 207-08 (noting that state prison populations
exceed capacity). Professor Blumstein explored the prison congestion problem
plaguing America's correctional facilities. Id. The professor stated that the overcrowding problem resulted from the configuration of the American criminal justice
system: "No other institution in American society is so centrally situated among
the three primary branches of government, so that each branch has only a limited
perspective on the institutional functions it affects." Id. The author noted that the
legislative branch tends to pass stringent laws to please constituents, yet fails to
provide the necessary resources for implementing such laws. Id. The judicial
branch, according to the author, pronounces strict sentences without concern for
prison overcrowding. Id. Professor Blumstein also remarked that prosecutors,
members of the executive branch, seek to impose strict sentences to exemplify their
public protection role. Id.; see also Elizabeth F. Edwards & Nancy G. LaGow, Note,
Prison Overcrowding As Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Light of Rhodes v. Chapman, 16
U. RiCH. L. REV. 621 (1982). The authors commented that although it is usually
true that no single prison condition violates the Eighth Amendment, many courts
have cited overcrowding as the primary determinant aggravating present confinement conditions. Id. at 629 (citation omitted). Moreover, courts noted that overcrowding produces the most damaging physical and mental distress for inmates.
Id.; see generally Jeff Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1125 (1989)
(exploring the difficulty in attempting to define prison crowding because it is a deceptively elusive concept).
12 See Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 55 (5th Cir. 1987) (alleged prison conditions of frigid, rat-infested cell could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if
inmate could prove that pain inflicted was "unnecessary and wanton") (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)); see also French v. Owens, 777 F.2d
1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1985) (prison conditions, including overcrowding, double ceiling, medical neglect, inadequate kitchen services, and excessive use of mechanical
restraints constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
The Seventh Circuit recognized that these conditions resulted in "serious deprivations of basic human needs." Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981)); see also Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 428 (3rd Cir. 1990)(totality of
prison conditions must be considered when determining if such conditions deprive
an inmate of "the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities").
13 See generally Lance D. Cassack, Hearing the Cries of Prisoners: The Third Circuit's
Treatment of Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 526 (1989). The
"hands off" doctrine, which refused prisoners their day in court, resulted from
prison officials' unfettered discretion in running such institutions. Id. at 532. Moreover, prisoners were regarded as "slaves of the State" who forfeited not only their
freedom, but also all their personal rights. Id. (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth,
62 Va. (1 Gratt) 790 (1871)).
14 See Timothy G. Ronan, Comment, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Double
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witnessed the advent of judicial activism in this arena. 15 Since
then, many courts have addressed prison conditions in the context of the Eighth Amendment, yet the judicial standards employed have varied from forum to forum. 16 Some courts studied
the prison condition's effects on inmates, 7 while other tribunals
attempted to identify culpable prison officials who allowed such
conditions to exist.' 8 Recognizing the need for courts to apply a
more uniform standard, the United States Supreme Court, in
Wilson v. Seiter, 19 declared that a prisoner must establish that
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to objectionable
20
prison conditions to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.
In Wilson v. Seiter, Pearly L. Wilson, a prisoner, filed an action
under the Civil Rights Act 2 ' against Richard Seiter, director of
Celing of Long Term Inmates-Cruel and Unusual Confinement-Rhodes v. Chapman, 28
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 519, 519 (1983) (noting that for many years courts deferred to
state legislatures and prison officials to correct prison overcrowding).
15 See Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison
Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 313, 314
(1983) (commenting that judicial activism began in the 1960's with litigation over
the barbaric prison conditions in the Arkansas penal system); Cassak, supra note 13,
at 533 & n.27 (observing that the birth ofjudicial activism in prison condition cases
resulted from Chief Justice Warren's activist influence and an increase in the
number of public interest lawyers who viewed inmates as another source of clientele).
Justice White once wrote: "[Tihough the fights may be diminished by the
needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisoners of this country."
Thornberry & Call, supra, at 314 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1974)).
16 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12. Various courts of appeals applied different
standards when determining that specified prison conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Rhodes Court
found that double-ceIling does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but
cited a series of circuit cases, all of which found various conditions of confinement
violative of the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. at
352 n. 17 (citations omitted).
17 See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 49-54, 71-78 and accompanying text.
19 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
20 Id. at 2326-27.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 1988). The Act stated, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, and
Carl Humphreys, warden of the prison in which Wilson was incarcerated. 22 In his complaint, Wilson alleged that overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, inadequate ventilation and the
practice of housing mentally and physically ill inmates within the
general prison population violated the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 23 Both parties moved for
summary judgment. 24 The United States District Court for the
District of Ohio granted respondents' motion. 25 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the prisoner failed to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation. 26 After granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the
case for reconsideration under a revised standard of deliberate
indifference.27
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
22 Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2322-23. The United States Justice Department joined
the petitioner as amicus curiae. Id. at 2322.
23 Id. Wilson's brief enumerated the allegedly inadequate conditions present at
Hockings Correctional Facility. Petitioner's Brief at 4-8, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321 (1991). Inmate Wilson noted that the air in the prison dormitory was stagnant and smelled of human waste. Id. at 4. The combination of an inadequate ventilation system and high dormitory temperatures approaching ninety-five degrees
in the summer months exacerbated these conditions. Id. Wilson also asserted that
the prison was infested with mice and a variety of insects. Id. Moreover, Wilson
alleged that often diseased inmates were charged with preparing the prison food.
Id. Wilson commented that these unsanitary conditions were heightened by overcrowding in the dormitory. Id. at 5. Finally, Wilson complained of inadequate
clothing and heat during the cold winter months. Id. For these allegedly inadequate confinement conditions, Wilson sought declaratory and injunctive relief in
addition to compensatory and punitive damages. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323.
24 Id. Wilson's affidavit described the facility's deficient conditions and alleged
that even after notification, the authorities failed to take any remedial action. Id.
The respondents' affidavit denied some of the specified conditions and asserted
that efforts were being made to improve the other uncontroverted conditions. Id.
25 Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 1990). The district court held
that the alleged conditions were not violative of the Eighth Amendment's guarantee. Id. at 863. The court established that to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, the prisoner must establish that prison officials acted with "obduracy and
wantonness" concerning the allegedly inadequate prison conditions. Id. (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
26 Id. at 867. The Sixth Circuit held that the prisoner's allegations were insufficient to establish a cruel and unusual punishment claim. Id. The court applied the
Whitley v. Albers intent standard of "obduracy and wantonness," to determine
whether the conditions complained of were violative of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
(citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)). The court of appeals ultimately
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees.
Id.
27 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323.
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remained a dormant provision 2 8 until 1910, when the Supreme
Court adjudicated Weems v. United States.2 9 In Weems, a Philippine
court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years of hard labor with
ankle and wrist chains for falsifying a public document.30
To
determine whether the defendant's punishment was proportional
to the offense, the Supreme Court compared the United States
penal law's punishment for forgery to the Philippine government's sanction." The Court reasoned that the defendant's punishment of fifteen years of hard labor was disproportionate to the
offense and therefore constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.3 2 In this incipient
Eighth Amendment pronouncement, the Supreme Court held
that retribution for a crime must be proportional to the offense.3
28 See Edwards & LaGow, supra note 11 at 623 (commenting that until the twentieth century "the [E]ighth [A]mendment was thought to have little use for the punishments which it originally protected were no longer acceptable"); see also Eric G.
Woodbury, Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman: Double-Ceiling By What Standard?, 23 B.C. L. REv. 713, 715-16 (1982) ("[T]he Amendment was deemed outmoded by the more civilized norms of American morality that prevailed at the turn of
the twentieth century.").
29 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
30 Id. at 366. The defendant was a disbursing official for the United States Government of the Philippine Islands who was convicted of making a false entry in a
public cash journal. Id. at 357-58. Under the Philippine Penal Laws, Weems not
only received a sentence of fifteen years of hard labor, but also had to pay a large
monetary fine. Id. at 358.
31 Id. at 380. The Court compared various United States sentences meted out as
retribution for crimes to the sentence Weems received under the Philippine Penal
Laws. See id. The Court noted that in the United States there are degrees of homicide that procure less stringent sentences. Id. The Court added that in the United
States the punishments for inciting rebellion, treason and conspiracy to destroy the
United States government by force were also lesser in degree than the Philippines'
punishment for forgery. Id. The Court compared the United States punishment for
forgery to the Philippine's sanction. Id. Specifically, the Court studied § 86 of the
United States Penal Laws, which criminalized forgery, yet imposed a far more lenient sentence than its Philippine counterpart. Id. Namely, the maximum prison sentence under the United States Penal Laws was two years, rather than fifteen. Id.
32 Id. at 381. The Supreme Court, in declaring this punishment cruel and unusual, noted that Weems' sentence was far too excessive for the crime: "He must
bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor.... It
may be hard labor pressed to the point of pain." Id. at 366.
33 Id. at 368. The Supreme Court stated: "What constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment has not been exactly decided. It has been said that ordinarily the terms
imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." Id. The Court explained that disproportionate punishments might constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. (citation omitted); see also Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretationof the Eighth
Amendment-Rummel, Solem, and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 789 (1984). The author reaffirmed that Weems marked the first time the
Supreme Court "undertook a comprehensive discussion of the [E]ighth
[A]mendment." Id. at 798. According to the author, the Court did not craft an
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Thirty-seven years later, the Supreme Court, in Francis v.
Resweber,34 extended the breadth of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause when applying the Eighth Amendment to capital
punishment. 35 In Francis, a Louisiana jury found the defendant
guilty of murder and the trial court sentenced him to death.3 6
The first electrocution attempt failed and the Governor of Louisiana authorized a second electrocution. 37 The prisoner asserted,
however, that a second electrocution, among other things, transgressed the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual
punishment.3 8
Addressing the prisoner's contention, the Court reasoned
that the thwarted electrocution, the presumptive result of
mechanical failure, was not intended to inflict unnecessary
pain. 9 The Court declared that the Eighth Amendment proexact definition of the Eighth Amendment, but instead proffered a broad interpretation that was "capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."
Id. at 802 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); see also John
B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 478 (1990). Professor Wefing noted that the methodology for interpreting the Eighth Amendment
was developed in Weems. Id. at 483. Professor Wefing also stated that the relative
obscurity of the Eighth Amendment lasted until a 1962 Supreme Court decision
that held the Eight Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
34 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
35 See id. at 463. Justice Reed, writing for the Court, noted that "traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in
the execution of the death sentence." Id.
36 Id. at 460.
37 Id. at 460-61. The first electrocution attempt occurred on May 3, 1946. Id. at
460. Although the executioner threw the switch, death did not result, presumably
because of mechanical failure. Id. The prisoner was removed from the electric chair
and returned to his cell. Id. The Governor subsequently issued a new death warrant, fixing the second electrocution for May 9, 1946. Id. at 460-61. The Louisiana
Supreme Court stayed the execution based on writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus directed at appropriate state officials, but ultimately denied the prisoner relief. Id. at 461. The state supreme court reasoned that no state
or federal law would be violated if the prisoner was subjected to a second electrocution. Id. Based on the exigencies of the situation, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the prisoner's contentions. Id.
38 Id. The prisoner asserted that a second electrocution constituted cruel and
unusual punishment because he experienced psychological strain due to the
thwarted attempt. Id. at 464.
39 Id. at 460, 464. The prisoner asserted that a second electrocution violated the
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision which prohibited the state from
punishing an individual twice for the same crime. Id. Regarding this allegation, the
Supreme Court reasoned that a second execution would not violate the double
jeopardy provision because the thwarted electrocution was the result of an accident
and not malevolence. Id. at 463. Thus, when an accident prevented the consummation of a state's sentence, the Court resolved, the state's subsequent action in the
fulfillment of this sentence did not constitute double jeopardy. Id.
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scribed the infliction of inherently cruel punishment upon convicted criminals.40 Thus, the Supreme Court held that because
the first electrocution Was impeded by an unforeseeable accident,
a second electrocution would not violate the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment.
A decade later, in Trop v. Dulles,4 2 the Court reexamined the
Eighth Amendment and declared that the revocation of one's citizenship as punishment for wartime desertion constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.4 3 Trop, an army deserter during
World War II, was court-martialled, sentenced to three years of
hard labor, received a dishonorable discharge and lost his
44
citizenship.
When deciding that such denationalization violated the Constitution, Chief Justice Warren, in a plurality opinion, stressed
that the Eighth Amendment places civilized restraints upon a
state when it seeks retribution for a crime. 45 Moreover, the Justice reasoned that citizenship is a fundamental right that deserves
constitutional protection. 46 Thus, the imposition of statelessId. at 464.
Id. at 463-64.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
43 Id. at 92-93. The Court noted: "Citizenship is not a license that expires upon
misbehavior... [a]nd the deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the government may use to express its displeasure of a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be." Id.
44 Id. at 87. Trop, a private in the United States Army, was stationed in Morocco
during World War II. Id. On May 22, 1944 Trop escaped from the Army stockade
in Casablanca, where he was serving time for a disciplinary breach. Id. The following morning, some Army personnel spotted Trop and a companion walking along a
road in the general vicinity of Casablanca. Id. Trop willingly accompanied the
Army personnel back to the base, thus ending his one day desertion. Id. As a consequence of his desertion, Trop was stripped of his citizenship under § 401(g) of
the Nationality Act of 1940. Id. at 87-88. Trop, however, was unaware that his
citizenship had been revoked until he applied for a passport in 1952. Id. at 88.
Section 4 0 1(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 provided in pertinent part:
A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth
or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:
(g) Deserting the military or naval force of the United States in
time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by court martial or dishonorably discharged from the services of such military or naval
forces.
Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 4 0 1(g) (West 1988).
45 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. ChiefJustice Warren wrote: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Id.
46 Id. at 101-04. The majority reasoned that the revocation of an individual's
citizenship is tantamount to "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society." Id. at 101. The Court further noted that the vast majority of civi40
41
42
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ness, as punishment for a crime, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 7 Ultimately, Chief Justice Warren held that the
Eighth Amendment must be characterized by a maturing paradigm of decency that has evolved with the development and
growth of society.48
In 1976, interpreting the Eighth Amendment so that it reflected 1970's mores and values, the Supreme Court affixed a
subjective intent requirement to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause when scrutinizing the medical treatment of prisoners. 4 9 In Estelle v. Gamble, an inmate brought a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,50 alleging that he was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment for the inadequate medical treatment he received for a back injury. 5 ' The Court declared that the
prisoner's allegedly inadequate medical treatment did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 52 At most, the Court proclaimed, the prisoner fell victim to medical malpractice, which
did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.53
The Court held that a prisoner alleging cruel and unusual punishment on grounds of inadequate medical treatment must prove
lized nations, except for the Philippines and Turkey, refused to impose
statelessness as a form of punishment. Id. at 102.
47 Id. at 103.
48 Id. at 100-01; see also Wefing, supra note 33, at 483-84. Professor Wefing
stated that the methodology developed in Trop remains the accepted doctrine today
and is "recognized by virtually all members of the Court." Id. Professor Wefing
conveyed that the "evolving standards of decency" definition could result in a variety of jurisprudential positions. Id. He noted, however, that recent decisions seem
to employ a sociological interpretation-namely, what society deems right and
wrong. Id. at 484; see also Woodbury, supra note 28, at 730 (commenting that the
Trop "evolving sense of decency" standard is the most frequently applied interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause).
49 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
50 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also supra note 21 for text of statute.
51 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99-100. A 600-pound cotton bale fell on Gamble while he
was unloading a truck, causing serious back injuries. Id. Gamble worked an additional four hours after receiving the injury. Id. at 99. His back later became so stiff
that prison officials permitted him to go to the prison infirmary. Id.
52 Id. at 106-07. Over a three month period, the prison doctors treated Gamble
for his back ailment on seventeen occasions, prescribing medication and bed rest.
Id. at 107. The injured prisoner asserted, however, that more should have been
done in terms of treatment and diagnosis. Id. The prisoner and the appellate court
agreed that an X-ray of the injured inmate's lower back should have been ordered.
Id. The Supreme Court, however, stated that doctors' failure to order an X-ray did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Rather, the Court envisaged that
this failure could potentially constitute malpractice and the proper forum for medical malpractice was in state court. Id.
53 Id. at 106. The Court stated that "medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id.
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that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference when
treating the prisoner's medical needs.5 4
One year after Estelle, in Hutto v. Finney,5 5 the Court declared
that the Eighth Amendment applied to cruel and unusual confinement conditions; specifically, confinement in an isolation
cell. 5 6 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens upheld a district
court's remedial orders 57 instituted to redress confinement conditions characterized by mass overcrowding, unsanitary and vermin-infested surroundings, inadequate food, the spread of
infectious diseases, and the standard practice of allowing certain
inmates to act as armed prison guards.5 8 The Supreme Court
54 Id. at 106. The Court explained: "In order to state a cognizable claim a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend
'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the [E]ighth [A]mendment." Id.; see
also Sue Woolf Brenner, The Parameters of Cruelty: Application of Estelle v. Gamble to
Sentences Imposed Upon the Physically Fragile Offender, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 286-87
(1984) (discussing application of Estelle deliberate indifference standard to inmates
with serious health problems for whom prison means certain physical agony and
possible death); Woodbury, supra note 28, at 375 (noting that Estelle marked the
first Supreme Court application of Eight Amendment judicial scrutiny to prison
living conditions, specifically prisoners' medical treatment).
In Estelle, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion criticized the majority for establishing a standard that "improperly attache[d] significance to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and unusual
punishment has been inflicted." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116. Justice Stevens posited
that Eighth Amendment determinations "should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it." Id.
55 437 U.S. 678 (1977).
56 Id. at 685. The Court declared that confinement in a prison or in an isolation
cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards. Id. In Hutto, the Court upheld a district court remedial order that limited the
length of time a prisoner could remain in isolation. Id. at 680-81. The conditions in
the isolation cell were characterized as follows:
Confinement in punitive isolation was for an indeterminate period of
time. An average of 4, and sometimes as many as 10 or 11, prisoners
were crowded into windowless 8' x 10' cells containing no furniture
other than a source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed
from outside the cell ....
Prisoners in isolation received fewer than
1,000 calories a day; their meals consisted primarily of 4-inch squares
of "grue," a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo,
syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the
mixture in a pan.
Id. at 682-83 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 680. The remedial orders asserted that a prisoner could only be put in
solitary confinement for a maximum of 30 days. Id. The remedial orders further
established that the prisoner's attorney's fees be paid out of the Department of
Corrections fund because the prison officials exhibited bad faith. Id. at 680-81.
58 Id. at 681. The Arkansas prisons were described as "a dark and evil world
completely alien to the free world." Id. Fights, stabbings and homosexual rapes
were rampant in the Arkansas penal system. Id. at 681 n.3. Some prisons even had

1992]

NOTE

1515

reasoned that the combination of such conditions might be tolerable for a few days, but were intolerably cruel for any longer period.5 9 Justice Stevens noted, however, that punitive isolation for
an indeterminate period is not per se cruel and unusual, but must
be considered along with the other confinement conditions.6 '
Although the Court indicated that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause had been violated, 6 ' the majority failed to articulate
a clear method for applying the Eighth Amendment to prison
62
conditions.
In the 1981 case of Rhodes v. Chapman,6 3 the Court crafted a
more precise Eighth Amendment interpretation to address cruel
and unusual prison conditions. 64 In Rhodes, inmates asserted that
the practice of "double-bunking" prisoners in a cell designed for
one inmate caused prisoners to be too closely confined, resulting
in cruel and unusual punishment.6 5 In determining that doublea program in which certain inmates, due to good behavior, would act as armed
prison guards for other inmates. Id. at 682 n.6. This system, known as the
"trustee" system, resulted in tremendous physical abuse of inmates meted out by
their armed peers. Id. Moreover, sanctions for misconduct were unpredictable,
cruel and unusual. Id. at 682. For example, inmates were whipped until their skin
was bruised and bloody. Id. at 682 n.4. Guards also punished inmates with a device
known as the "Tucker-telephone"-a hand-cranked apparatus that administered
electric shocks to sensitive parts of a prisoner's body. Id. at 682 n.5.
59 Id. at 686-87.
60 Id. at 686; see also Martin K. Thomas, Note, The Effect of Rhodes v. Chapman on the
ProhibitionAgainst Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 35 ARK. L. REV. 731 (1982) (discussing how Hutto fits the continuum of Eighth Amendment interpretations and noting
that "[t]his decision increased the number of factors to be considered" thereby
broadening the operation of the standard); Woodbury, supra note 28, at 736 (declaring that Hutto articulated a totality of the conditions approach).
61 See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685-86 (acknowledging that the Commissioner of Correction and members of the Arkansas Board of Correction did not disagree with the
district court's finding that the prison conditions constituted cruel and unusual
punishment).
62 See Montick, supra note 7, at 230. The author stated: "In Hutto v. Finney, the
Court reinforced the notion that conditions of confinement are a proper subject for
[E]ighth [A]mendment scrutiny." Id. The author also articulated that the Hutto decision's "precedential value for delineating a precise standard for all condition
cases remains tenuous." Id. at 230 n.17.
63 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
64 Id. Two inmates at Southern Ohio Correctional Facility brought a § 1983 action alleging that double-ceiling inmates violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
339-40; see generally Thornberry & Call, supra note 15 (exploring application of
Eighth Amendment to Rhodes v. Chapman and the subsequent effect of Rhodes on
lower court decisions and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
65 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339. Two years before Rhodes, the Court entertained the
concept of "double-bunking" as a deprivation of pre-trial detainees' liberty without
due process of law, as required by the Fifth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 530 (1979). The Fifth Amendment applied because the controversy involved
pre-trial detainees and not convicted criminals. Id. The Eighth Amendment was
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celling did not violate the Eighth Amendment, the Court considered objective factors, including the physical surroundings of the
prison and the availability of other rooms for the inmates.6 6 The
Court concluded that the inmates were not confined solely to
their cells and had much opportunity throughout the day to use
other rooms at the prison.6 7 The Court reiterated that cruel and
unusual punishment claims are to be decided by "evolving standards of decency ' 68 and held that Eighth Amendment prison
condition decisions must be based on an objective determination
of the facts.6 9 Consequently, the Court's objective analysis of
the Rhodes facts failed to evidence conditions proscribed by
inapplicable because these confined individuals had not yet been convicted of a
crime. Id.The Court held that the practice of "double-bunking" did not violate the
Fifth Amendment, stating: "We disagree with both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals that there is some sort of 'one man, one cell' principle lurking in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 542. The Court reasoned that
the pre-trial detainees were not confined solely to their cells and had adequate
space to move about throughout the day. Id. at 543. See Rod Smolla, Prison Overcrowding and the Courts: A Roadmap for the 1980s, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 389 (1984)
(exploring the impact of Bell v. Wolfish and Rhodes v. Chapman and on subsequent
prison condition cases).
66 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 342. Applying the objective factor approach to the prison
conditions at issue, the Rhodes Court concluded double-ceiling of inmates did not
deprive the prisoners of medical care, sanitation or essential food. Id. at 348.
Moreover, the incidence of violence among inmates did not increase and the educational and vocational opportunities only diminished marginally. Id. The Court further declared that "[d]ouble ceiling had not reduced significantly the availability of
space in the dayrooms or visitation facilities, nor had it rendered inadequate the
resources of the library or school rooms." Id. at 342. The prison, Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility, was described as a "top-flight, first-class facility." Id. at 341.
The prison was constructed in the 1970's and, in addition to 1,620 cells, it contained workshops, schoolrooms, chapels, a hospital ward, barbershop, commissary,
library and a garden and recreation field for inmate use. Id. at 340-41.
67 Id. at 341.
68 Id. at 346; see also supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
69 Id. at 347. The Court noted that an example of an objective factor approach
appeared in opinions applying the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment. Id. at
346. To determine whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated the
"evolving standards of decency," the Court considered objective factors derived
"from history, the action of state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries." Id. at
346-47 (citations omitted). Interestingly, the Court declared that the deliberate indifference standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble also relied on objective facts. Id.
at 347. Specifically, the majority recognized that the Estelle Court had looked to
"the fact, recognized by the common law and state legislatures, that '[a]n inmate
must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to
do so, those needs will not be met.' " Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976)).
The Rhodes majority added that the objective factor approach also applied to
confinement conditions. Id. Conditions cannot "be grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime warranting imprisonment," nor can they involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. The majority noted that confinement condi-
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"evolving standards of decency." ' 70

Four years later, in Whitley v. Albers, 7 1 the Supreme Court departed from the Rhodes objective factor approach and again embraced a subjective intent inquiry for adjudicating Eighth
Amendment claims.72 In Whitley, a prison guard, attempting to
quell a violent prison riot, shot an inmate in the left leg. As a
shot while confined
result, the injured inmate asserted that being
7
1
punishment.
unusual
and
constituted cruel
The Supreme Court declared, however, that the guard exerted a genuine attempt to return the prison to a secure status
and to save lives. 75 Specifically, the Court inquired into the
tions, alone or in combination, would be cruel and unusual if they deprived
prisoners "of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id.
70 Id. at 347-50. See also supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for discussion
of the "evolving standards of decency" definition; Susan N. Herman, Institutional
Litigation in the Post-Chapman World, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 299, 302, 30809 (1983-84). Professor Herman declared that Chapman was the most encouraging
Supreme Court decision involving inmate's rights to come down in a decade. Id. at
302. Moreover, according to Professor Herman, Chapman reaffirmed thejudiciary's
obligation to "scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement." Id. at 308
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981)). The author commented
that the opinion "to some degree encourages meaningful federal court review." Id.
at 309; see also Ronan, supra note 14, at 539. The author stated that Rhodes v. Chapman confirmed the federal judiciary's position as the final arbiter of Eighth Amendment claims involving prison conditions. Id. Ronan commented that the Supreme
Court answers the perennial question of who will watch the keepers themselves"[t]he federal courts will." Id. But see Woodbury, supra note 28, at 746 (criticizing
the Rhodes decision as unsatisfactory precedent for cruel and unusual punishment
analysis it signaled a reversion to the "hands off" doctrine, in which the federal
judiciary will defer to the decisions and policies of the legislatures).
71 475 U.S. 312 (1985).
72 Id. at 321. In the 1976 case of Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court crafted the
subjective intent inquiry of deliberate indifference to determine whether an inmate's medical treatment qualified as cruel and unusual. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Although the Whitley Court returned to a subjective intent
analysis, the Court formulated the more exacting standard of "obduracy and wantonness." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. The Whitley Court declared that the Estelle deliberate indifference standard was inappropriate because deliberate indifference "can
typically be established or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing
institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff and other inmates." Id. at 320.
See also Robert A. West, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Quelling a Prison Riot: Cruel and
Unusual Punishment or a Necessary Infliction of Pain?, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 208 (1986)
(tracing the development of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and its application to Whitley, proclaiming that the Whitley holding narrowed the parameters of the
Eighth Amendment).
73 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314. It should be noted that a prison official had been
taken hostage and the guard who fired at the inmate believed that the inmate was
going to harm the hostage. See id. at 315.
74 Id. at 317.
75 Id. at 326. The Court stated: "Under these circumstances, the actual shooting
was part and parcel of a good-faith effort to restore prison security. As such, it did
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prison official's state of mind to determine whether the official's
conduct was characterized by obduracy and wantonness.7 6 The
Court determined that the guard's actions were not characterized
by obduracy and wantonness and held that there was no Eighth
Amendment violation because the actual shooting was not intended to inflict wanton or unnecessary pain.7 7 The Court established that this state-of-mind inquiry was the applicable standard
to determine whether prison conditions, a prisoner's medical
treatment, or the methods used in restoring order during a
prison riot constitute cruel and unusual punishment.7"
Cognizant of the need to apply an equitable standard to
prison condition claims, 79 the Supreme Court, in Wilson v.
not violate respondent's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments." Id.
76 Id. at 319-20. Moreover, the Court established that a claimant must "allege
and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction" for an Eighth Amendment violation to exist. Id.
77 Id. at 324.
78 Id. at 319 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). See also
Melissa Whish Coan, Note, Whitley v. Albers: The Supreme Court's Attempted Synthesis of
Eighth Amendment Standards For Prison Officials, 14 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 155 (1988). The author opined that the Whitley Court failed to articulate
a clear Eighth Amendment standard by which prison guards may gauge their behavior when punishing prisoners. Id. at 168. Furthermore, the author forewarned
that this holding would inhibit subsequent cruel and unusual punishment violations. Id.
See also Elizabeth A. Blackburn, Note, Prisoners' Rights: Will They Remain Protected
After Whitley?, 16 STETSON L. REV. 385 (1987). The author lambasted the Whitley
decision as "further mudd[ying] the already murky waters surrounding the issue of
prisoners' rights." Id. at 387. Courts are charged with protecting prisoners' Eighth
Amendment rights, yet Whitley signaled a return to the pre-1960's "hands off" doctrine. Id. at 393, 408. Ultimately, the author indicated that this more exacting intent standard would adversely affect substantive prisoner rights: "The strict
standard identifies and dismisses those claims that involve 'mere negligence' and a
lack of ordinary care as claims outside the constitutional realm." Id. at 406 (citation
omitted).
79 The following cases represent a small portion of the myriad of federal cases
that have addressed various aspects of prison conditions in light of the Eighth
Amendment: Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1991) (confinement to
prison cell pursuant to policy requiring all inmates not attending classes or working
to be confined did not violate any liberty interest of prisoner); LaBounty v. Adler,
933 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1991) (black prisoner allegedly required to complete vocational training to qualify for electrician maintenance program brought action alleging equal protection and Eighth Amendment violations); United States v. Michigan,
940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991) (trial court should not impose overly intrusive remedies to alleviate conditions of confinement, but instead should exercise reason and
restraint in performing its oversight duty); Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.
1991) (deliberate indifference standard applied to determine whether prison officials' failure to protect an inmate from fellow inmate's assaults qualified as cruel
and unusual punishment); Porth v. Farrier 934 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1991) (confine-
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Seiter,8 0 declared that an Eighth Amendment violation requires
proof that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to allegedly unconstitutional confinement conditions.*8 Writing for
the majority, 2 Justice Scalia explained that the ban on cruel and
unusual punishments applied both to punishments that are specifically meted out as part of the sentence and to deprivations
suffered during imprisonment.8 3
The Justice proclaimed that
implicit in the Eighth Amendment lies a subjective intent requirement that must be proven for punishment to qualify as cruel and
unusual.8 4 Thus, the majority demonstrated that for the punishment of a prisoner without bedding, mattress or clothes for 12 hours did not violate
the Eighth Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1991) (affirming trial court's dismissal of inmate's claim alleging that medical malpractice constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d
1326 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that officials did not violate an assaulted inmate's
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment absent a showing that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent or acted with reckless disregard); Kaminsky v.
Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1991) (inmate's widow filed action against medical doctor and prison officials to recover for deliberate indifference to prisoner's
medical needs); Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1991) (proper
question was whether the warden acted with deliberate indifference to pervasive
risk of harm present at the prison), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 97 (1991); Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir. 1991) (unavailability of funds for jail facilities did not
justify maintenance of unconstitutional conditions); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d
320 (5th Cir. 1991) (unsound medical treatment of an inmate did not qualify as
§ 1983 claim for the deliberate indifference to prisoner's medical needs); Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990) (state prison policy allowing
involuntary coupling of nonsmokers with smokers, could qualify as deliberate indifference to nonsmoking inmates' health); Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir.
1990) (prisoners established a prima facie cruel and unusual punishment claim
when they were disciplined for refusing to clean out prison facility's raw sewage
station without necessary protective equipment and clothing); Mandel v,Doe, 888
F.2d 783 (11 th Cir. 1989) (medical malpractice did not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation); Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1989) (allegations of polluted water and unsanitary food handling qualified as Eighth Amendment cause of action); Taylor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1989) (denial of
medical treatment could violate Eighth Amendment if prison officials evidenced
deliberate indifference to inmate's medical needs); Cowans v. Wyrick, 862 F.2d 697
(8th Cir. 1988) (no Eighth Amendment claim is established without evidence of
some pain suffered by inmate); Peterkin v.Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988) (the
confinement of capital prisoners to cells for 22 hours each day did not violate
Eighth Amendment); Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988) (prison conditions did not violate Eighth Amendment).
80 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
81 Id. at 2327 (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987)).
82 Id. at 2322. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter joined. Id.
83 Id. at 2323 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
84 Id. The Justice relied heavily on the Estelle decision to illustrate the presence
of a subjective intent requirement. Id. justice Scalia noted: "Since we said, only the
,unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' implicates the Eighth Amendment, a
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ment to be deemed cruel there must exist some level of culpability on the official's part.85
Justice Scalia next addressed the Court's vacillation between
subjective and objective standards used to interpret the Eighth
Amendment. 86 The Justice explained that the Rhodes v. Chapman
decision,8 7 which called for an objective approach to determine
whether prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment,
marked a brief departure from the evolving intent88requirement
associated with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The majority made clear, however, that this departure from
the subjective intent requirement was short-lived.8 9 The Court
explained that, less than one year later, the subjective intent requirement resurfaced in Whitley v. Albers, 90 when the Court declared that the conduct prohibited by the Eighth Amendment was
characterized by obduracy and wantonness. 9 ' Thus, claimed Justice Scalia, the Whitley holding marked the resurgence of a subjective intent requirement in cruel and unusual punishment
claims. 92
prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege 'deliberate indifference' to his 'serious' medical needs. 'It is only such indifference' that can violate
the Eighth Amendment." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
85 Id. at 2323 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). The Justice referenced the Francis v. Resweber decision as further evidence of the existence of an Eighth Amendment
culpability requirement. Id. Specifically, Justice Scalia focused on Francis's "wanton
infliction of pain" requirement and concluded that this demonstrated an intent requirement within Eighth Amendment judicial scrutiny. Id. (quoting Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)).
86 Id. at 2324. The Justice elucidated that the Court had once temporarily departed from the subjective culpability standard and opted instead to use an objective factor approach to determine whether prison conditions were in violation of
the Constitution. Id. (citations omitted).
87 452 U.S. 337 (1981). See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (discussing
Rhodes v. Chapman).
88 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324. Justice Scalia explained that Rhodes focused on an
objective interpretation of the Eighth Amendment: Was the human deprivation
suffered sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment? Id. (citing
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). According to Justice Scalia, the subjective interpretation-the official's state-of-mind requirement-was not considered in
the context of Rhodes. Id.
89 See id
90 475 U.S. 312 (1985).
91 See Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2324. See also supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text
(discussing Whitley v. Albers).
92 Id. The majority quoted Whitley:
It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good
faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection
with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs,
or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.
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Justice Scalia next addressed the petitioner's 93 suggestion
that the Court make a distinction between short-term and continuing confinement conditions. 94 The majority observed that the
petitioner believed an intent requirement was applicable to
short-term conditions, but not to systemic conditions.95
Disagreeing with the petitioner's proposition, Justice Scalia
declared that if the inflicted pain was not specifically imposed as
punishment by the sentencing judge or by statute, then a level of
culpability must be attributed to the prison official before the infliction can qualify as cruel and unusual. 96 The majority contended, however, that the long duration of cruel prison
conditions might evidence the required intent; yet, in no way
would the mere presence of such conditions cause the intent requirement to vanish.97 In conclusion, the Court reasoned that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to rationally implement
short-term versus long-term condition distinctions.98

Justice Scalia then turned to examine the United States Justice Department's argument that a subjective intent requirement
would raise additional defenses for prison officials. 9 9

Justice

Scalia rebuffed the Justice Department's argument that prison officials could claim that they made a good faith effort to eliminate
the inhumane prison conditions, but were stymied by fiscal constraints.' 00 The majority noted that a cost defense was never
Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1985)).
The petitioner in Wilson conceded that some conditions did not rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 2325. For example, the petitioner agreed
that if a boiler malfunctions during a cold winter, the inmate could not assert a
viable Eighth Amendment violation. Id. The concurrence attacked the majority's
reliance on Estelle, Resweber and Whitley, pointing out that those cases "did not involve 'conditions of confinement' but rather 'specific acts or omissions directed at
individual prisoners.' " Id. at 2324 n. 1.
93 Id. The United States Justice Department joined the petitioner as amicus curie. Id. at 2322.
94 Id. at 2325.
95 Id.
96 Id. The majority quoted Judge Posner, who stated: "The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter." Id. (citation omitted). Thus,
Justice Scalia suggested that if the pain inflicted was not intended as a form of
retribution, then intent must attach. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. The Court stated: "Apart form the difficulty of determining the day or
hour that divides the two categories.., the violations alleged in specific cases often
do not lend themselves to such pigeonholing." Id.
99 Id. at 2326.
100 Id.

1522

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1505

raised by respondents and, therefore, was not at issue. 10 '
Having determined that a subjective intent requirement was
relevant, the majority next considered what state of mind should
apply to prison condition claims. 10 2 The Court recalled that in
previous cases wantonness was the appropriate standard required for punishment to qualify as cruel and unusual. 10 3 According to the majority, both the petitioner and the respondent
agreed that the standard of obduracy and wantonness was too
04
exacting a standard in the context of prison condition cases.'
The Court noted the petitioner's belief that a culpability requirement, if relevant, should not exceed the standard of deliberate
indifference.' 0 5
The respondent's counter-argument, added the Justice,
called for the application of two different standards: a deliberate
indifference standard for claims in which the inmate was injured,
and a malice standard for claims in which no physical harm occurred. 0 6 The Court disagreed with the respondent's counterargument, however, and stated that the wantonness of the conduct is determined by the constraints placed on the prison official
rather than the effects upon the prisoner.0 7 The majority agreed
with the petitioner's stance and denoted that deliberate indifference is the correct standard to apply to challenges to confinement conditions. 0 8
101 Id. The majority claimed that "the validity of a 'cost' defense as negating the

requisite intent [was] not at issue in this case.
Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. Justice Scalia noted that in emergency situations, wantonness is characterized by sadistic and malicious acts that are intended to cause harm. Id. By contrast,
the Justice pointed out that in regard to a prisoner's medical needs, the prison
officials' deliberate indifference satisfied the wantonness standard. Id. (citing
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 320 (1986)).
104 Id. at 2326. Justice Scalia commented: "The parties agreed with the consistent holdings of the lower courts that the very high state of mind prescribed by
Whitley does not apply to prison condition cases." Id. (citations omitted).
105

Id.

Id. The respondents contended that the deliberate indifference standard was
applicable to cases involving personal injury claims raised while confined, but a
malice standard should be employed when there was no "detriment to bodily integrity, pain, injury, or loss of life." Id.
107 Id. The majority relied on Whitley and stated that if "the conduct is harmful
enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim . ..
whether it can be characterized as 'wanton' depends upon the constraints facing the
official." Id. (citation omitted)(emphasis in original).
108 Id. at 2327. The Court reasoned that conditions of confinement that include
food, space, sanitation and clothing are as much a condition as prisoners' individual
medical needs. Id. To strengthen its position, the Court quoted Justice Powell,
who reasoned: "Whether one characterizes the treatment received by [the pris106
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Having identified deliberate indifference as the appropriate
governing standard, the Court addressed the petitioner's contention that the appellate court erred in dismissing the claim because the combination of the alleged conditions'0 9 rose to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation." 0 The Court stressed
that, for a combination of conditions to be deemed cruel and unusual, the conditions must be mutually re-enforcing and also result in the deprivation of a specific human need."' The Court
reserved judgment on whether the alleged conditions2 in this instance constituted an Eighth Amendment violation."1
Turning to the Sixth Circuit's affirmation of the district
3
court's order for summary judgment in favor of respondents,",
the Court found that the appellate court relied on the more exacting standard of obduracy and wantonness. Consequently, the
Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the deliberate indif4
ference standard." 1
oner] as inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical
needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the 'deliberate indifference' standard articulated in Estelle." Id. (citation omitted).
109 Id. The Court enumerated some of the allegedly cruel and unusual conditions, which included inadequate cooling, overcrowding and the housing of mentally ill inmates with the general prison population. Id.
110 Id.The Court noted that "[niothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can
rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a
single human need exists." Id.
II I Id. For example, the majority stipulated that a cold prison cell combined with
a lack of adequate blankets illustrated how separate confinement conditions might
combine to violate the Eighth Amendment. Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. The Court concluded that while the court of appeals' reference to negligence might have led to an erroneous finding, it could have been merely harmless
error. Id. Nevertheless, exercising an "abundance of caution," the Court required
a reevaluation of the case under the proper standard. Id.
114 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, relying on
Wilson, recently held that exposure to secondary smoke did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 1991). In
Steading, an asthmatic prisoner alleged cruel and unusual punishment resulting
from his exposure to smoke produced by other inmates and guards. Id. at 499. The
court noted that Wilson v. Seiter established that evidence of a prison official's culpable mental state was necessary for confinement conditions to qualify as punishment.
Id.at 500. The court declared that this standard established an insuperable impediment to the prisoner's claim. Id.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that secondary tobacco smoke was common in
restaurants, offices and other public domains, yet "[n]o one supposes that restaurateurs who allow smoking are subjecting their other patrons to 'punishment', or desire to harm them." Id. Thus, because the smoking guards and inmates did not
intend to harm the asthmatic inmate, the court opined that their behavior did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. Id.Ultimately, the court proclaimed that the estab-
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Concurring solely in the judgment," 15 Justice White disagreed with the majority's requirement of subjective intent in
cases involving conditions of confinement." t 6 Justice White emphasized that a level of culpability is not required to prove an
Eighth Amendment violation when the suffering or pain is actually imposed as part of the convicted criminal's sentence." 7 The
Justice stressed that prior Supreme Court decisions have established that conditions of confinement are actually considered
part of the punishment.' 18 Thus, Justice White reasoned that in
the context of prison conditions, no fixed test would suffice to
determine whether the Eighth Amendment has been violated."t 9
The concurrence remarked that previously the Court relied
on objective factors to determine whether confinement conditions were cruel and unusual. 120 The Justice turned to the reasoning in Rhodes v. Chapman to evidence the existence of an
objective approach.' 2 ' According to Justice White, Rhodes expliclishment of smoke-free prisons, or smoke-free sections within the institution, failed
under Wilson. Id.
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invoked the Wilson decision, holding that a prisoner's rape did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991). Inmate McGill,
described as young and small, received a number of physical threats and sexual
advances by other inmates. Id. at 346. As a result, McGill requested that he be
placed in a protective custody unit within the prison. Id. Unable to fully comply
with his request, prison officials placed McGill in a segregated area that housed
inmates on disciplinary segregation status. Id. While showering in the segregated
unit, McGill was sodomized by a fellow inmate. Id. The prison guard charged with
monitoring the shower area had left his post without authorization. Id. at 350. McGill alleged that the rape and the prison officials' failure to prevent it constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 346.
The court held, however, that this "unpleasant happening" did not qualify as
punishment because the inmate failed to prove that the officials deliberately neglected his safety. Id. at 349-50. The court declared that the prisoner should have
warned the guards of the impending rape threat. Id. at 351. The court stated that
the inmate's failure to impute the guards with actual knowledge coupled with his
decision to accept the risk while showering precluded him from asserting an Eighth
Amendment violation. Id. at 351, 353.
115 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2328 (White, J., concurring). Justice White delivered the
concurrence in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. The concurrence stated: "[W]e have made it clear that the conditions are
themselves part of the punishment, even though not specifically 'meted out' by a
statute or judge." Id.
119 Id. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text for discussion of the Rhodes v.
Chapman decision.
120 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329.
121 Id. Justice White stressed:
Rhodes makes it crystal clear, therefore, that Eighth Amendment chal-
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itly called for an objective standard, under which one looks to see
if the human deprivations suffered were sufficiently serious to
22
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Further denouncing the majority's position, the concurrence
attacked Justice Scalia's reliance on cases that dealt with specific
individual prisoner claims, resulting from the acts or omissions of
prison officials, rather than cases that addressed the issue of
prison conditions. 12 3 Moreover, the concurrence asserted that
Whitley v. Albers clearly called for an objective standard in challenges to prison conditions.' 24 Thus, the concurrence asserted
2 5
that the majority had departed from established precedent.'
Justice White further predicted that the implementation of a
subjective intent requirement would probably be impossible in a
large number of cases. 12 6 Justice White noted that inhumane
prison conditions are frequently the result of cumulative behavior by numerous government officials over a significant period of
time. 12 7 Accordingly, the Justice suggested that it is difficult to
128
determine whose intent truly governs.
Finally, Justice White addressed the ease by which a prison
official, under the guise of a subjective intent requirement, could
defeat a section 1983129 prison condition claim.'3 0 Specifically,
the Justice noted that officials need only assert that the inadequate prison conditions were the result of inadequate funding,
allowing the official to circumvent the issue of deliberate indifferlenges to conditions of confinement are to be treated like Eighth
Amendment challenges to punishment that is "formally meted out as
punishment by the state or the sentencing judge,"-we examine only
the objective severity, not the subjective intent of government
officials.
Id. at 2329-30 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325).
122 Id. at 2330.
123 Id. (White, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice White referred to the majority's reliance on Francisv. Resweber, Estelle v. Gamble and Whitley v. Albers. Id. See also
supra notes 34-41, 49-54, 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing those cases).
124 Id. The Justice, quoting Whitley, emphasized: "An express intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required .. .and 'harsh conditions of confinement' may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. (citations omitted).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. The concurrence noted that "it is far from clear whose intent should be
examined, and the majority offers no real guidance on this issue." Id. The Justice
commented that lower courts often relied on an objective factor method. Id. at
2330, 2324 n.1.
129 See supra note 21 (quoting relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
130 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (White, J., concurring).
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ence. 131 In conclusion,Justice White posited that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should be guided by a "contemporary
standard of decency."' 3 2 The deliberate indifference standard,
deprivaJustice White postulated, would result in serious human
33
tions because of cruel and unusual prison conditions.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence involving prison condition claims needed a uniform standard that would facilitate continuity and fairness among this country's courts. 134 Until Wilson
v. Seiter, the standards employed spanned the continuum from
objective factor approaches to varying subjective intent requirements. 1 3 5 Recognizing the need for a uniform test, the Supreme
endorsed the deliberate indifference
Court affirmatively
36
standard. 1
The deliberate indifference standard will prove quite workable when an individual prisoner suffers a specific Eighth Amendment deprivation resulting from the actions or inactions of
prison officials. For example, if an inmate receives inadequate
medical treatment due to official action or inaction, the affected
inmate can rely on the deliberate indifference standard to evidence cruel and unusual punishment.13 7 In this scenario, there is
a single, specific deprivation and also identifiable officials to
which the intent requirement of deliberate indifference can
attach.
Although sufficient for specific deprivation claims, the deliberate indifference standard will prove wholly inadequate to address prison overcrowding claims. As distinct from specific
individual claims, overcrowding is caused by a multitude of factors working concurrently and affecting a large number of inmates. In this scenario, inmates asserting an overcrowding claim
will have the impossible task of trying to conjoin an official with
this subjective culpability. Moreover, overcrowding is most often
the result of inadequate funding, 38 to which no culpability can
be attributed. Thus, the Wilson holding will have a chilling effect
Id. at 2330-31.
Id. at 2331 (citation omitted).
133 Id. at 2330-31
134 Id. at 2331.
135 See supra notes 46-75 and accompanying text for discussion of the varying
Eighth Amendment standards employed by the Supreme Court over the years.
136 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
137 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
138 McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991). The majority commented
that the legislature ultimately controls the size and number of prisons built. Id. at
349. Furthermore, crowding is endemic because taxpayers demand longer
'3'
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on prisoners' valid prison overcrowding claims. This frustration
will not only result in the decrease of successful overcrowding
claims, but also will ultimately result in a judicial regression to
the pre-1960's laissez-faire stance toward prison overcrowding.
This relapse directly contravenes the purposes of the American judiciary. The judicial branch of our government is charged
with the duty of interpreting and upholding the Constitution,
which was designed to protect the rights and interests of the people, especially powerless and disfavored minorities. In this instance, courts must remain involved to protect the rights and
interests of inmates. Prison overcrowding is not a popular issue
among elected officials and often it goes unredressed if left to the
legislative branch of government. ' 39 Thus, to protect the unpopular, judicial intervention is essential. Should federal courts be
unwilling to act, then state courts must intervene.' 40
Chief Justice Warren established that the Eighth Amendment must be interpreted by "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 4 1 With the maturation of society, we have witnessed the power and effectiveness of
judicial intervention in a number of controversial areas, such as
public school desegregation and the right to affordable housing. 142 The judicial branch can and has effectively supervised
sentences that increase prison populations, yet are unwilling to pay for the increased space needed. Id.
139 See Smolla, supra note 65, at 421. The author concluded his article by proclaiming: "Courts . ..play a crucial role in dealing with the overcrowding crisis:
they must remain the nagging conscience of government. The evolving standards
of decency embodied in the [E]ighth [A]mendment too often fail to surface in the
budget messages of governors and appropriations bills of legislatures." Id.
140 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Justice Brennan discussed the importance of
state court activism in protecting individual liberties. Id. Justice Brennan eloquently stated:
[S]tate courts no less than federal are and ought to be the guardians
of our liberties .... State constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to
inhibit the independent protective force of state law - for without it,
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
Id. at 491.
141 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
142 See Woodbury, supra note 28, at 719-20. The author stressed the necessity for
judicial intervention in claims involving prison overcrowding. Id. Furthermore, the
author recalled the success of judicial activism in other "administrative areas, such
as education and welfare." Id. (citing Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971)
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the implementation of its decisions in such perplexing areas. 43
Following evolving standards of decency, the judiciary is bound
to uphold such precedent and, consequently, must remain active
in the area of prison overcrowding.
Not only will the deliberate indifference standard stymie judicial intervention, it will also be circumvented. As the concurrence and petitioners in Wilson noted, prison officials can
effortlessly avoid this intent standard by simply asserting that the
overcrowding was the result of inadequate funding. As Justice
White asserted, prisoners will have the onerous job of trying to
satisfy this elusive standard and, in the process, many valid cruel
and unusual punishment claims will go unredressed.
A far more feasible standard is one grounded in objectivity.
Specifically, courts should focus on the objective and recognizable effects prison conditions have upon inmates, rather than focusing on a prison official's subjective intent. Jurists should
scrutinize objective factors-such as the inmates' physical condition, their mental well-being and the conditions of the prisonand query whether the deprivations suffered are serious enough
to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Such an objective
approach will prove feasible not only with specific individual deprivations, but also with more systemic deprivations resulting from
overpopulated prisons. Furthermore, with an objective standard,
circumvention is no longer an issue. Rather, courts will look for
physical proof evidencing cruel and unusual punishment instead
of a prison official's state of mind. Such an objective standard
will prevent valid Eighth Amendment claims from going unredressed and ultimately will protect the rights and interests of
that unpopular minority, the American inmate.
Matthew J. Giacobbe
(draft boards); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare officers); Brown v.
Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(public schools)).
143 See Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinaryand Extraordinary
in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). The authors noted that in
many institutional litigation cases the judiciary "only began to prescribe the specific
details of institutional reform when it became clear that state and local officials were
not likely to cooperate." Id. at 492. Continuing, the professors commented that "it
does not seem to be an outrageous abuse ofjudicial authority for courts to supervise state and local authorities in order to ensure that these officials protect the
constitutional rights of prisoners, patients, and school children." Id. at 494. Ultimately, the authors declared that federalism and separation of powers should not
restrain judicial intervention when courts attempt to protect constitutional rights in
institutional litigation cases. Id. at 501.

